Emirati Exit From OPEC Signals Shift for GCC
Eschewing bloc politics, the UAE is seeking the direct management of its interests.
By Mehran Haghiran and Jessica Obeid
A version of this article was originally published in French in Le Grand Continent.
The decision by Abu Dhabi to leave the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is about more than energy policy. The move reflects a broader frustration with regional and international frameworks that no longer match how the United Arab Emirates sees its interests, both in the Gulf and beyond. The Iran war has brought that reassessment forward, not just for Abu Dhabi, but across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capitals, which largely share the same perceptions and predicaments.
The timing of the Emirati decision is central to understanding it. While the announcement comes as the war is paused, the ceasefire is uncertain and the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed. The Gulf’s core systems are under pressure as shipping is disrupted, insurance costs have surged, energy flows are unstable, food cargo has been delayed, and aviation networks have been partially shut down. In this environment, coordination mechanisms that depend on stability have lost their meaning in the absence of meaningful action.
The region’s growing integration into global markets has created strength, but also vulnerability. Ports, airspace, desalination plants, financial systems, and supply chains are all part of the same ecosystem. Once disruption begins in one area, it spreads quickly.
Since the start of the conflict, Emirati officials have signaled a growing dissatisfaction with the institutions the country has long been part of. That includes not only OPEC, but also the GCC itself, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The criticism has been consistent in that these platforms are not delivering, especially as the UAE has wanted to play a stronger role while its peers seek the same.
Energy Ambitions
For OPEC, the dissatisfaction runs way longer. The UAE has long been uncomfortable with constraints that do not reflect its capacity or ambitions. It has invested heavily in production and infrastructure and has pushed repeatedly for higher quotas within OPEC.
Since 2021, the UAE has consistently advocated for an unconditional increase in production, arguing that current market conditions justify higher supply. Over the medium term, it aims to raise output capacity to 5 million barrels per day (mbpd); around 1.5 mbpd above its current quota. This created a structural tension within OPEC, where production ceilings may constrain the UAE’s ability to fully utilize its planned capacity.
In the near term, output is effectively limited by reduced export capacity due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. However, the UAE’s strategy is clearly forward-looking: positioning itself to capture a larger share of global markets once logistical constraints ease and production caps are revisited.
When conditions stabilize, the UAE will be able to increase production without being bound by OPEC limits. That matters in a market that is likely to remain volatile for some time. It also gives Abu Dhabi greater control over how it responds to shifts in demand and supply. This will likely trigger countermeasures from other producers, especially Saudi Arabia, further intensifying competition for market share.
The UAE is placing greater emphasis on control, flexibility, and direct management of its interests. That applies to partners, to institutions, and to adversaries.
There is also a precedent. Qatar left OPEC in 2018 during the blockade imposed by its GCC partners. That decision was not only about energy policy but it was about positioning. The UAE is now doing something similar, but in a far more consequential context. By doing so, it is also trying to shed light on a systemic crisis in the region and globally and demanding an international response or repercussion.
The war has introduced a level of uncertainty that makes flexibility more valuable than coordination. When flows through Hormuz are disrupted, when vessels hesitate to transit, and when insurance costs become prohibitive, the ability to adjust production quickly becomes more important than adherence to group quotas. For the UAE, this is not only a constraint to be removed but an opportunity to reposition itself.
UAE-Saudi Rift
The UAE’s move also needs to be understood in the context of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. The divergence between the two countries did not begin, or end, with the war. It has been building for nearly a decade and since 2016, the relationship has gradually shifted from alignment to competition. Vision 2030 and the UAE’s economic model are not complementary. They compete for the same capital, the same logistics role, the same talent, and the same position in the global economy.
Yemen made those differences visible earlier this year. What began as a joint military effort in 2015 evolved into a series of disagreements over objectives, partners, and outcomes in the decade that followed. That divergence is no longer tactical as heightened military conflict was seen just back in February. It reflects a broader difference in how each country approaches the regional order and its own role within it.
The war paused that tension for a short period but it obviously did not resolve it. If anything, it has brought it back into focus. The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC without consulting Saudi Arabia is part of that story. It signals a willingness to act independently on issues that were previously managed within a framework of coordination. That framework was fragile before the war, and this decision effectively broke it.
The decision creates a difficult moment for OPEC and for Saudi Arabia. OPEC has always relied on a degree of cohesion among its leading producers, and the UAE stood as the group’s fourth largest producer. That cohesion is now under strain. The UAE’s exit weakens the perception of unity and raises questions about how durable the current structure is under prolonged pressure. As of now, only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are OPEC members from the GCC which now need to work more closely with Iran and Iraq.
Shifts Across the GCC
The broader question is whether the UAE’s move remains limited to OPEC or becomes part of a wider pattern. Abu Dhabi has already signaled that it is reassessing its position across multiple organizations. Other states in the region are also reviewing their options. The war has forced a reconsideration of how these multilateral frameworks, bilateral relationships, and foreign investments function, and whether they are worth maintaining in their current form.
But this is not a move toward isolation. The UAE is not configured for isolation as a policy option. Its economic model depends on openness. It relies on being a hub for trade, logistics, finance, aviation, and global movement. That will not change. All six GCC states are on the same boat.
What is changing is how they approach their relationships. The UAE is placing greater emphasis on control, flexibility, and direct management of its interests. That applies to partners, to institutions, and to adversaries. Even with Iran, the UAE is likely to maintain a managed relationship after the war. Managing relations does not require trust. It requires a clear understanding of interests and limits.
The same applies across the GCC. These states are not moving toward disengagement from the international community. Quite the opposite, but they are moving toward more selective engagement. There is now less assumption of alignment and more differentiation in how each state responds to the same set of pressures.
For years, the Gulf was often described as a bloc. That description was always incomplete and the war has made clear that each state is operating according to its own calculus. The UAE is moving earlier and more openly than others, but it is not alone in that direction. The decision to leave OPEC is one step in the process of reevaluating policy options and reflects a region that is no longer coordinating under a shared framework, but adjusting under pressure, each state in its own way and seeking to establish its agency within the international system.
Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Research and Programs at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. His work centers on conflict resolution and diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Persian Gulf region. Haghirian holds a PhD in Gulf Studies from Qatar University. He currently leads the Integrated Futures Initiative and the Rihla Initiative for Green Economic Growth.
Jessica Obeid is Founding Partner of New Energy Consult (Dubai) and a senior energy engineer and strategist with over 17 years of experience across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. She has advised governments, the private sector, and multinational institutions in more than 40 countries, and has held roles at Chatham House, the Middle East Institute, SRMG Think, and the United Nations Development Programme, among others. Jessica is a Gulf Committee Member of the Rihla Initiative for Green Economic Growth.
Section: (integrated-futures-initiative) Photo: Government of Dubai Media Office