By Mehran Haghiran and Jessica Obeid

A version of this article was originally published in French in Le Grand Continent.

The decision by Abu Dhabi to leave the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is about more than energy policy. The move reflects a broader frustration with regional and international frameworks that no longer match how the United Arab Emirates sees its interests, both in the Gulf and beyond. The Iran war has brought that reassessment forward, not just for Abu Dhabi, but across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capitals, which largely share the same perceptions and predicaments.

The timing of the Emirati decision is central to understanding it. While the announcement comes as the war is paused, the ceasefire is uncertain and the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed. The Gulf’s core systems are under pressure as shipping is disrupted, insurance costs have surged, energy flows are unstable, food cargo has been delayed, and aviation networks have been partially shut down. In this environment, coordination mechanisms that depend on stability have lost their meaning in the absence of meaningful action.

The region’s growing integration into global markets has created strength, but also vulnerability. Ports, airspace, desalination plants, financial systems, and supply chains are all part of the same ecosystem. Once disruption begins in one area, it spreads quickly.

Since the start of the conflict, Emirati officials have signaled a growing dissatisfaction with the institutions the country has long been part of. That includes not only OPEC, but also the GCC itself, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The criticism has been consistent in that these platforms are not delivering, especially as the UAE has wanted to play a stronger role while its peers seek the same.

Energy Ambitions

For OPEC, the dissatisfaction runs way longer. The UAE has long been uncomfortable with constraints that do not reflect its capacity or ambitions. It has invested heavily in production and infrastructure and has pushed repeatedly for higher quotas within OPEC.

Since 2021, the UAE has consistently advocated for an unconditional increase in production, arguing that current market conditions justify higher supply. Over the medium term, it aims to raise output capacity to 5 million barrels per day (mbpd); around 1.5 mbpd above its current quota. This created a structural tension within OPEC, where production ceilings may constrain the UAE’s ability to fully utilize its planned capacity.

In the near term, output is effectively limited by reduced export capacity due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. However, the UAE’s strategy is clearly forward-looking: positioning itself to capture a larger share of global markets once logistical constraints ease and production caps are revisited.

When conditions stabilize, the UAE will be able to increase production without being bound by OPEC limits. That matters in a market that is likely to remain volatile for some time. It also gives Abu Dhabi greater control over how it responds to shifts in demand and supply. This will likely trigger countermeasures from other producers, especially Saudi Arabia, further intensifying competition for market share.

The UAE is placing greater emphasis on control, flexibility, and direct management of its interests. That applies to partners, to institutions, and to adversaries.

There is also a precedent. Qatar left OPEC in 2018 during the blockade imposed by its GCC partners. That decision was not only about energy policy but it was about positioning. The UAE is now doing something similar, but in a far more consequential context. By doing so, it is also trying to shed light on a systemic crisis in the region and globally and demanding an international response or repercussion.

The war has introduced a level of uncertainty that makes flexibility more valuable than coordination. When flows through Hormuz are disrupted, when vessels hesitate to transit, and when insurance costs become prohibitive, the ability to adjust production quickly becomes more important than adherence to group quotas. For the UAE, this is not only a constraint to be removed but an opportunity to reposition itself.

UAE-Saudi Rift

The UAE’s move also needs to be understood in the context of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. The divergence between the two countries did not begin, or end, with the war. It has been building for nearly a decade and since 2016, the relationship has gradually shifted from alignment to competition. Vision 2030 and the UAE’s economic model are not complementary. They compete for the same capital, the same logistics role, the same talent, and the same position in the global economy.

Yemen made those differences visible earlier this year. What began as a joint military effort in 2015 evolved into a series of disagreements over objectives, partners, and outcomes in the decade that followed. That divergence is no longer tactical as heightened military conflict was seen just back in February. It reflects a broader difference in how each country approaches the regional order and its own role within it.

The war paused that tension for a short period but it obviously did not resolve it. If anything, it has brought it back into focus. The UAE’s decision to leave OPEC without consulting Saudi Arabia is part of that story. It signals a willingness to act independently on issues that were previously managed within a framework of coordination. That framework was fragile before the war, and this decision effectively broke it.

The decision creates a difficult moment for OPEC and for Saudi Arabia. OPEC has always relied on a degree of cohesion among its leading producers, and the UAE stood as the group’s fourth largest producer. That cohesion is now under strain. The UAE’s exit weakens the perception of unity and raises questions about how durable the current structure is under prolonged pressure. As of now, only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are OPEC members from the GCC which now need to work more closely with Iran and Iraq.

Shifts Across the GCC

The broader question is whether the UAE’s move remains limited to OPEC or becomes part of a wider pattern. Abu Dhabi has already signaled that it is reassessing its position across multiple organizations. Other states in the region are also reviewing their options. The war has forced a reconsideration of how these multilateral frameworks, bilateral relationships, and foreign investments function, and whether they are worth maintaining in their current form.

But this is not a move toward isolation. The UAE is not configured for isolation as a policy option. Its economic model depends on openness. It relies on being a hub for trade, logistics, finance, aviation, and global movement. That will not change. All six GCC states are on the same boat.

What is changing is how they approach their relationships. The UAE is placing greater emphasis on control, flexibility, and direct management of its interests. That applies to partners, to institutions, and to adversaries. Even with Iran, the UAE is likely to maintain a managed relationship after the war. Managing relations does not require trust. It requires a clear understanding of interests and limits.

The same applies across the GCC. These states are not moving toward disengagement from the international community. Quite the opposite, but they are moving toward more selective engagement. There is now less assumption of alignment and more differentiation in how each state responds to the same set of pressures.

For years, the Gulf was often described as a bloc. That description was always incomplete and the war has made clear that each state is operating according to its own calculus. The UAE is moving earlier and more openly than others, but it is not alone in that direction. The decision to leave OPEC is one step in the process of reevaluating policy options and reflects a region that is no longer coordinating under a shared framework, but adjusting under pressure, each state in its own way and seeking to establish its agency within the international system.

Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Research and Programs at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. His work centers on conflict resolution and diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Persian Gulf region. Haghirian holds a PhD in Gulf Studies from Qatar University. He currently leads the Integrated Futures Initiative and the Rihla Initiative for Green Economic Growth.

Jessica Obeid is Founding Partner of New Energy Consult (Dubai) and a senior energy engineer and strategist with over 17 years of experience across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. She has advised governments, the private sector, and multinational institutions in more than 40 countries, and has held roles at Chatham House, the Middle East Institute, SRMG Think, and the United Nations Development Programme, among others. Jessica is a Gulf Committee Member of the Rihla Initiative for Green Economic Growth.

Section: (integrated-futures-initiative) Photo: Government of Dubai Media Office

By Mehran Haghirian and Mohammed Baharoon

A version of this article was originally published in French in Le Grand Continent.

Beyond the tragedy, the US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the Iranian strikes targeting the Gulf states – which continued unabated from 28 February 2026 until the April 8 ceasefire – have starkly highlighted a glaring absence: the Gulf region fundamentally lacked any security architecture.

The semblance of order that existed before the outbreak of this war was based on a polarization of how the various states in the region perceived security and threats. On the one hand, the Iranian threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and, on the other, the US threat stemming from Washington’s presence in the region dictated a fragile balance based on deterrence, external protection and ad hoc, discreet diplomacy between Iran and the Arab states. This balance has ceased to exist.

The threat is no longer merely perceived: all sides of the Gulf were ablaze.

The question is no longer whether a new regional security framework is needed, but who the actors will be, how they will interact with one another, and whether this new architecture could be purely regional — or whether it needs to extend further.

Restoring Trust and Deterrence

The Iranian attacks have caused a profound rift in Tehran’s relations with the Arab states on the other side of the Gulf and have undermined the tentative trust that had begun to take root through regional diplomacy over the past five years. Rebuilding that trust will be difficult and will take time. Whatever political configuration emerges in Tehran after the war, restoring relations with the Gulf states will necessarily become one of the most important priorities of any future Iranian government’s foreign policy — even if this is a consideration that the Islamic Republic’s new leaders have, for the time being, set aside.

Before the war, expert discussions on the future of the regional security architecture in the Gulf — in which we were involved — focused primarily on the new national security matrix encompassing the domains of energy, food, health and environmental security.

The war will necessitate an even broader reassessment of the Gulf’s security arrangements. And this new analytical framework will not only address the capacity to repel attacks, but it will also have to address the issue of deterrence itself.

One possible consequence of this new paradigm would be to compel the Gulf to become a highly securitised region. The Gulf Cooperation Council will inevitably engage in collective security coordination in the short term, which could include pooling stocks of interceptors, investing in next-generation air defence systems, strengthening crisis communication mechanisms, or establishing security arrangements modelled on NATO mechanisms.

These efforts are likely to become a central feature of the region’s trajectory in the near future, particularly in the context of expanding military ties with a group of countries that have proven themselves to be reliable partners.

Geopolitics of Grand Coalitions

However, contrary to what might have been expected, the resumption of discussions on a strategic alliance in the Middle East bringing together the Gulf states, Israel and the United States may not be an automatic consequence of the war.

Whilst the Iranian attacks might have accelerated such a rapprochement, this is an option that the Gulf states have so far rejected and may continue to avoid, as it would place them in a state of permanent war with a regional neighbor. The GCC states are just as concerned about the Islamic Republic as they are about Israel’s respective regional ambitions — for both powers have shown that brutal military action is their preferred means of resolving disputes. Conversely, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s tradition of patience and strategic restraint means it does not believe that military power alone leads to stability.

In the Middle East, a new order, even after this war, would not mean a total withdrawal of the United States. Nor would it mean, for those with ties to Israel, a complete reversal of that relationship.

Rather, it would involve a careful adjustment aimed at establishing a security architecture that strengthens the autonomy and agency of each state by taking into account the complex network of geopolitical ties and interests.

At the same time, the war has highlighted just how closely the security and stability of the Gulf are linked to global strategic interests: any future regional framework will almost certainly involve external actors whose economic and military presence in the region is already deeply entrenched.

China’s role as a major importer of Gulf energy, a key player in global trade networks and a guarantor of the negotiated détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia ensures that Beijing has a direct interest in preserving maritime routes, energy infrastructure and political stability in the region. Russia, which has already put forward proposals for a collective security framework at the United Nations Security Council, may seek to re-engage as debates on regional security evolve. The European Union and the United Kingdom have also strengthened their strategic and economic engagement in the region. India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil and other countries also have growing interests in the stability of the Gulf.

The diplomatic response to Iran’s attack on member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council has been global — notably with UN Security Council Resolution 2817 demanding that Iran cease its attacks, which was co-sponsored by 135 countries. This resolution was paving the way for a global response that began to manifest itself in discussions aimed at forming an alliance or consortium to maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

The war has highlighted just how closely the security and stability of the Gulf are linked to global strategic interests: any future regional framework will almost certainly involve external actors whose economic and military presence in the region is already deeply entrenched.

Such frameworks could resemble initiatives similar to the global coalition in the war on terror — which would exacerbate military polarization in the region and lock both sides of the Gulf into long-term animosity that will almost certainly lead to further instability, chaos and global repercussions.

What the war has highlighted is not merely military vulnerability: it has revealed the limits of deterrence and diplomacy, as well as the fragility of food supplies, water desalination systems, airspace, maritime transport, logistics, digital infrastructure, banking reliability and tourism. A diplomatic resolution to the conflict could lay the foundations for an inclusive, realistic security framework rooted in regional cooperation. The first step, however, is to better understand the ends, not the means.

Ends Not Means

Previous proposals for dialogue, cooperation and regional security have all been rejected as insufficient.

Iran had proposed the “Hormuz Peace Endeavor.” Russia has repeatedly reiterated its idea of collective security. China has put forward the idea of transforming the region into an “oasis of security.” The Gulf Cooperation Council itself had presented the “GCC Vision for Regional Security in 2024,” which remains to this day the most comprehensive framework for cooperation in the region. Whilst none of these proposals attracted sufficient interest at the time, they all reflected a recognition that the existing order was inadequate. There has never been a serious collective effort to replace it. War now demands a change of course.

Before any meaningful de-escalation can take place, a new frame of reference will need to be established. Yesterday’s red lines have now been crossed and the region needs a collective vision of security that is not based on political consensus, but on overlapping national interests.

Without this, any de-escalation or diplomatic resolution of the conflict will merely delay the resurgence of tensions or war, without resolving the problems that have now resurfaced.

Deterrence will not be solely military in nature. It must be based on a network of interests that constitute lifelines for the region and on the realization that these — like the Strait of Hormuz — are also vital arteries for the entire world.

Amidst the barrage of missiles and drones, it was difficult to see these discussions making progress today. But ultimately, the means matter little: only the ends should guide our path towards the future.

Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Research and Programs at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. His upcoming book, Differentiating Foreign Policy Strategies in the Persian Gulf: The Decision-Making Calculus towards Iran, will be published by Springer in 2027.

Mohammed Baharoon is the director general of Dubai Public Policy Research Center (b’huth) in Dubai. He is also a founding member of the board of the Bussola Institute, a think tank in Brussels that focuses on the changing and emerging aspects of the partnership between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council member states.

Section: (integrated-futures-initiative) Photo: Canva

By Mehran Haghirian and Abdullah Baabood

The Strait of Hormuz has always mattered, but rarely has that been as visible as it is today. For centuries, it has linked the Gulf to wider trading routes across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Today, a significant share of the world’s energy supplies and other commodities pass through this narrow stretch of water. When Hormuz is disrupted, the effects are not regional, but global, and they are felt quickly. It is for this reason that U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to send Iran back to “stone ages” if it does not reopen the Strait.

What began as a military escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran on February 28 is now spilling into the infrastructure that sustains global connectivity. Shipping routes are under pressure, insurance costs are rising, and commercial operators are hesitating. The Strait has not been formally closed, but it is no longer functioning normally. That distinction matters less than it once did. In practical terms, constraint can be as disruptive as closure.

Against this backdrop, recent talks between Iran and Oman are significant. As the Strait falls in shared Iranian and Omani waters, officials from both sides have met to discuss how to ensure the continued passage of vessels under current conditions. On the surface, this may appear as crisis management and an attempt to keep traffic moving and prevent further escalation. But it also raises a more fundamental question of who gets to shape the rules of access to one of the world’s most important waterways?

The talks with Iran are consistent with that approach. Oman is trying to reduce risk, keep communications open, and prevent escalation from spiraling further. But there are limits to what it can or will support. Oman’s interests are tied to the uninterrupted functioning of the Strait. Its economy depends on it. Its regional relationships depend on it. Its diplomatic credibility depends on it. Any arrangement that conditions or politicizes passage would put all of that at risk. Engagement, in this context, should not be mistaken for endorsement.

Tehran is exploring ways to exert greater control over transit, whether through coordination mechanisms, selective passage, or other forms of informal regulation. Even if presented as technical or temporary measures, such ideas carry wider implications. They suggest an Iranian attempt, however tentative, to redefine how the Strait operates for seven other countries who depend on it as well as the entire international community who relies on it.

But that is where the problem lies. The Strait of Hormuz is not something that can be reorganized through bilateral understandings, even between actors as central as Iran and Oman. It is, in every meaningful sense, an international waterway. Its openness is not just a legal principle; it is a practical necessity for the functioning of the global economy. Energy flows, supply chains, shipping networks, and financial systems all converge at this narrow point.

That reality places clear limits on what any one country, or even a small group of countries, can do. Efforts to impose new conditions on passage, whether formal or informal, are unlikely to hold. The number of stakeholders is simply too large, and their interests too deeply embedded. From Asian energy importers to European industries, the costs of disruption extend far beyond the Gulf. This is not a regional issue that can be managed quietly. It is a systemic one that inevitably draws in wider attention.

Diplomatic activity is picking up at the United Nations and by global leaders as conversations about maritime security are expanding beyond the region. Bahrain’s resolution demanding an end to Iranian actions in the Strait was co-sponsored by 135 countries. While another resolution was vetoed by China and Russia at the Security Council, there is a growing, if still cautious, recognition that freedom of navigation in the Strait cannot be left exposed to prolonged uncertainty or unilateral pressure.

Iran itself seemed to acknowledge this logic not long ago. In 2019, it proposed the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), which rested on the idea that stability in the Strait requires collective responsibility. Its current actions are moving in the opposite direction.

This kind of ambiguity can be useful in the short term. It creates leverage without forcing a decisive confrontation. But it is not stable. Markets do not adapt well to prolonged uncertainty, and neither do supply chains. Over time, pressure builds-for clarity, for predictability, and ultimately for intervention.

The Strait of Hormuz is not something that can be reorganized through bilateral understandings, even between actors as central as Iran and Oman. It is, in every meaningful sense, an international waterway.

This is where Oman’s role becomes particularly important. Muscat has long positioned itself as a mediator with open channels to Iran while remaining closely connected to its GCC partners and the broader international community. Its approach is often described as neutral, but that can be misleading. It is not neutrality for its own sake; it is a strategy aimed at preserving stability in a difficult and unstable environment.

There is also a longer historical thread here. During the Iran-Iraq War, when tanker routes in the Gulf were under direct threat, Oman resisted efforts to frame regional security in purely confrontational terms. Sultan Qaboos understood that stability required coexistence, even among adversaries. During the Iran-Iraq War in 1984, Sultan Qaboos argued that “here in Muscat we do not believe it to be in the interest of security in the Gulf that Iran feels we intend to establish an Arab military pact that will always be hostile to it, or that we are about to form a joint force, whose main task is to fight Iran.” He further added that “there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Persians in the end, and there is no alternative to a minimum of accord in the region.” That insight still holds.

Yet the current trajectory risks moving in a different direction. By raising the cost and risk of passage through Hormuz, Iran may be seeking to deter external involvement. In practice, it could have the opposite effect. The more the Strait becomes a source of sustained disruption, the more likely it is to attract broader international engagement and intervention. What begins as a regional pressure tactic can quickly become a global concern.

For the Gulf states, the implications are equally significant. Their preference for de-escalation and economic transformation is harder to sustain if their primary economic lifeline is directly threatened. At some point, restraint stops looking like prudence and starts looking like exposure.

That is the strategic paradox. Iran’s approach is designed to increase leverage but it risks triggering the internationalization of the conflict beyond control. Efforts to change the status quo and access to the Strait may ultimately lead to greater external involvement, be it through maritime coordination, naval presence, or more direct measures.

The Strait of Hormuz is too central to the global system to remain in prolonged uncertainty. It will remain an international waterway not simply because of legal norms, but because the world cannot function without it. The real question is how far the current disruption is allowed to go before that reality is enforced, and what the region looks like by the time that point is reached.

Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Research and Programs at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. His upcoming book, Differentiating Foreign Policy Strategies in the Persian Gulf: The Decision-Making Calculus towards Iran, will be published by Springer in 2027.

Abdullah Baabood is an Omani academic currently serving as the Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.

Section: (integrated-futures-initiative) Photo: Canva

By Mehran Haghirian

The war unfolding now in the Persian Gulf has produced something more dire than just another episode of escalation between Iran and its Arab neighbors. It has created a rupture. For years, the region has lived through tensions, proxy confrontations, maritime incidents, sanctions, and diplomatic breakdowns without crossing into this kind of direct and sustained assault across the Gulf itself. That threshold has now been crossed. Aside from the collapse of the security architecture of the region, this is a rupture in how Iran is understood across the Gulf, and it will shape perceptions for years to come.

The Islamic Republic made the decision to turn the Gulf into a theater of war. This was not an improvised move. For more than three decades, it was understood that if Tehran faced what it perceived to be an existential threat, it might seek to set the Gulf on fire. The scenario was long contemplated, widely predicted, and yet rarely treated as probable. It is now the reality from which the region must begin to think about its future. Across much of the Gulf, Iran is now the “betrayer,” an “enemy,” and a “terrorist” state.

The region has experienced three Gulf wars in recent decades, but none came close to igniting all eight littoral shores simultaneously. Within hours of the escalation, the Islamic Republic attacked five of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By the second day, Oman had also been targeted. Cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones struck across the region. Debris from intercepted missiles has fallen into residential neighborhoods. Civilian casualties have been recorded across Iran, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman.

Bitter Memories

Politically, the shock has been profound. Resentment toward Tehran is now visible in Gulf capitals and among the public. Memories of earlier attacks remain vivid. In 2016, scenes of Iranians storming the Saudi diplomatic facilities in Tehran and Mashhad. In 2019, tankers off the UAE coast were struck by limpet mines widely attributed to Iran. Later that year, drones and missiles attacked Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. In January 2022, Houthi drones struck Abu Dhabi and Dubai, killing three people. None of those incidents, however, come close to the level of threat, shock, and anger generated by the present war. Leaders, citizens, and residents across the GCC are unlikely to forget the scenes of missiles over their cities, and the attacker.

Some GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, opposed the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers largely because they feared an empowered Iran with closer ties to Washington. Those same countries were the primary supporters of Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. The region’s calculus began to shift in 2021, after Gulf states were confronted more directly with the risks posed by the Islamic Republic and shifted strategy to contain it with diplomacy.

Despite tensions, the region moved toward dialogue. Gulf leaders pragmatically concluded that Iran could not simply be isolated and therefore had to be engaged. Oman has never severed ties with Iran. Qatar enhanced relations with Tehran as the 2017 blockade was imposed on it by some of the GCC states. Backchannel talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran continued for years before culminating in the 2023 rapprochement. The UAE and Kuwait also moved to reinstate diplomatic ties in 2022. Bahrain was about to finalize a détente with the Islamic Republic prior to the June 2025 war. What has now collapsed is not diplomacy itself, but the assumption that Gulf states might choose to engage Iran, even while it projects a threat.

Gulf reactions to the war would have been far more reactionary and extreme had there not been substantive and successful diplomacy in the preceding years. Gulf capitals remain cautious about allowing the war to expand further.

Gulf reactions to the war would have been far more reactionary and extreme had there not been substantive and successful diplomacy in the preceding years. Gulf capitals remain cautious about allowing the war to expand further. The region’s leaders understand that escalation will complicate efforts to restore stability in the region while maintaining a viable relationship with Iran. Even so, there are reports that the leaders of the UAE and Saudi Arabia are “pressing Trump in regular phone conversations to finish the job and destroy Iran’s military capabilities before moving on.” The UAE’s ambassador to Washington wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the international community “can’t let Iran hold the U.S., the UAE and the global economy hostage. A simple cease-fire is not enough.” On March 23, Bahrain drafted a UN resolution that would authorize the use of force to open the Strait of Hormuz.

Before the war, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan had emphasized the goal of closing the chapter of tensions with Iran. That chapter has now been reopened. Publicly, Gulf states remain cautious about aligning with Israel, despite the expansion of ties under the Abraham Accords and the dynamics that led to the current war. At the same time, overwhelming dependence on the U.S. has pushed several GCC states toward a degree of practical coordination that may deepen after the war.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have downgraded diplomatic relations with Iran by expelling the military attaché and reducing embassy staff, though none have severed ties entirely. Qatar has arrested ten suspects linked to an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps cell operating in Doha, while the UAE has also detained individuals with links to the IRGC and Hezbollah. The UAE closed the Iranian hospital, university, school, and social club, and is considering freezing billions of dollars of Iranian assets, one of the few remaining channels through which Iran has access to foreign currency.

Durable Ties

However, the rupture is not yet permanent. Transnational ties, trade routes, migration patterns, family relations, and business networks that have connected Iran and the Arab states for decades, if not centuries, remain intact. They have been disrupted, in some cases severely, but they continue to exist beneath the level of interstate conflict. The Gulf remains a shared Arab-Iranian space.

An awareness of this shared space is reflected in the recognition among Gulf leaderships that a prolonged state of conflict is incompatible with their economic agendas and national visions. The shift toward diplomacy over the past five years was tied to a broader understanding that stability is a prerequisite for growth, investment, and long-term transformation. That calculation has not disappeared because of the war.

The war has also unfolded alongside a profound transformation inside Iran itself. The succession following the death of Ali Khamenei and the rise of his son, Mojtaba, have reopened longstanding questions about the legitimacy and future of the Islamic Republic. Whether the system consolidates or collapses, this moment will shape how Iran approaches the region, and how regional countries approach Iran, in the years ahead.

The trust deficit is no longer confined to governments. It now sits with the public. Across the Gulf, people watched missiles cross their skies, saw debris fall into their neighborhoods, and witnessed civilians killed in cities they consider among the safest in the world. That memory will not fade quickly, and it will shape how Iran is seen across the region for years to come.

There is a real risk that the actions of the Islamic Republic become indistinguishable, in the public imagination, from Iran itself. There is a recognition in the Gulf—sometimes explicit, sometimes implied—that what is unfolding is the result of decisions taken by a state that has long been disconnected from its own population. That distinction leaves open a narrow but important space for something other than complete breakdown. If the distinction collapses, the rupture created by this war will harden into something far more durable, making any future attempt at rebuilding relations significantly more difficult.

The Gulf’s relations with Iran have been ruptured and cannot be restored quickly. But the question is whether the underlying connections that have historically linked Iran and its Arab neighbors can endure long enough to serve as the basis for a new regional order. What survives after the war may ultimately matter more than what has been broken.

Mehran Haghirian is the Director of Research and Programmes at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. His work centers on conflict resolution and diplomacy, with a particular focus on the Persian Gulf region. Haghirian holds a PhD in Gulf Studies from Qatar University and a master’s degree in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service in Washington, D.C.

Photo: Wikicommons

By Nikolay Khozhanov

The evolving global energy landscape can catalyse stronger ties between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the countries of Central Asia. Over the past fifteen years a cascade of disruptions has reshaped energy markets—beginning with the shale revolution, followed by the accelerated fourth energy transition, underinvestment in hydrocarbons, the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and, most recently, the return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025.

These overlapping shocks have reshaped the structure of global energy markets, causing their volatility and giving rise to several new defining trends. Uncertainty has become systemic, undermining the ability to predict market dynamics. Traditional trade flows have shifted: Russia has redirected energy exports to Asia and the Middle East, while the EU’s hydrocarbon phase-out and the US’s pivot towards energy exports have intensified competition for Asian markets. As a part of this strategic shift, the GCC countries had an opportunity to play a role in replacing the lost volumes of Russian hydrocarbons at the European market. While in 2021 the total import of mineral fuels from the GCC to the EU was worth €25.1 billion, in 2022 it peaked at €65.5 billion and remained high at €58.4 billion in 2023. By 2024, fuel made up over 75 percent of the EU’s total imports from the GCC region.

Simultaneously, global political and economic instability has slowed the decline of fossil fuels even as it accelerates the push for renewable energy sources. One of the major forces in this transition is China. No longer a passive participant, Beijing has emerged as both a top importer of Gulf hydrocarbons and a global leader in renewable technology exports. By the mid-2020s, Gulf producers supplied more than 40% of China’s crude oil imports. Saudi Arabia has consistently vied for the position of Beijing’s leading supplier, while Oman, the UAE, and Kuwait also rank among China’s key energy partners. At the same time, China has become indispensable for the Gulf’s renewable ambitions: Chinese firms play a dominant role in providing solar and wind equipment to the region. In 2022 and 2023, for example, the UAE sourced 99.1 percent and 98.8 percent of its solar modules from China, while Oman relied on Chinese imports for 78.6 percent and 83.5 percent of its modules in those years. This dual role has strengthened China’s position as a central energy pivot between Asia and the Middle East and opened doors for cooperation between China and GCC member states in third countries, including Central Asian republics.

Dual-Track Strategy

The Gulf states have responded to the energy markets upheaval with a dual-track strategy: protecting hydrocarbon revenues while advancing green transformation. On the defensive front, GCC producers are working through OPEC+ to stabilise markets and are maximising export capacity through efficiency gains—for example, by replacing domestic oil use with natural gas.

At the same time, energy producers across the Gulf region are engaging in mutually beneficial cooperation that extends beyond traditional alliances. This includes efforts to enhance each other’s export capabilities. For example, Kuwait is reducing domestic oil consumption—thereby freeing more crude for export—by importing LNG from Qatar, even at the apparent cost of greater energy dependence on a single supplier.

This practice extends beyond the region as well. GCC member states increasingly have the opportunity to invest in the downstream and upstream sectors of potential competitors outside of the Gulf. In doing so, they form new alliances and diversify future revenue streams, thus disincentivising potential competition among oil and gas producers.

On the “green” track, notable progress has also been made. To enhance the environmental image of their hydrocarbon exports, GCC countries are actively investing in carbon capture technologies and integrating renewables into oil and gas production and export processes. A distinct—albeit often controversial—component of this strategy is the development of “blue” and “green” hydrogen projects. Additionally, GCC investors are showing growing interest in overseas ventures related to renewable energy development, particularly in emerging supply chains for the components and materials essential to renewable generation and distribution.

Amid these dynamics, closer energy ties with Central Asia are emerging as a strategic extension of the GCC’s global ambitions. Both regions possess vast hydrocarbon reserves and share a rising commitment to renewable development. Their partnership is being formalised through high-level diplomacy—most notably the 2023 GCC-Central Asia Summit, which produced a joint action plan (2023-2027) focused among other things on energy, trade, and infrastructure.

The intersection of global energy realignment and regional ambition has opened a window of opportunity for enhanced Gulf-Central Asia energy cooperation.

Several specific areas of cooperation are gaining momentum. GCC countries are increasingly demonstrating interest in expanding into Central Asian energy sectors, including oil, gas and electric energy production. The UAE’s ADNOC is in discussions with Kazakhstan’s QazaqGaz regarding potential joint ventures, and with Turkmenistan’s Türkmengaz to co-develop the Galkynysh gas field. These moves align with Turkmenistan’s goal of reducing overdependence on China.

Through Dragon Oil, the UAE also holds a stake in offshore oil production in Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power is spearheading a $7.5 billion investment in Uzbekistan’s power infrastructure, including a 1.5 GW gas plant. In 2024, Qatar’s Nebras Power and Pearl Overseas expressed interest in building combined-cycle and hydroelectric plants in Kazakhstan.

Both regions are investing in alternative transport corridors to bypass traditional chokepoints, opening further avenues for mutual cooperation. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are advancing the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor,” with potential extensions to Gulf ports via Turkey and Iraq’s planned “Dry Canal.” This would establish a north–south energy axis, reducing both transit time and cost. GCC actors like DP World and AD Ports are already involved in developing logistics infrastructure at key Caspian ports like Aktau and Baku. The geopolitical role of Iran is also worth noting. Integrating Iran into regional transport corridors could significantly enhance trade flows between Central Asia and the Middle East.

At the same time, Kazakhstan and the UAE are operating tankers on the Caspian Sea to transport oil to Azerbaijan for onward shipment to Europe, partially bypassing Russian-controlled routes. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have also shown interest in ambitious cross-border infrastructure projects, including the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline and the long-proposed Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to Europe.

On top of these efforts, the GCC-Central Asia cooperation could possibly enhance knowledge exchange and local capacity building. Several Gulf-funded energy projects in Central Asia are structured as joint ventures with local partners, facilitating the transfer of technical expertise and operational know-how. For example, the 1 GW wind farm in Kazakhstan—developed by the UAE’s Masdar in partnership with Qazaq Green Power and the Kazakhstan Investment Fund—ensures active participation by local engineers and firms in both construction and project management. There is also growing interest in academic cooperation, with institutions in both regions exploring joint programmes in petroleum engineering and renewable energy.

Finally, GCC and Central Asian producers also have potential for coordinating efforts at the policy level. Kazakhstan and Oman, alongside other GCC members, participate in OPEC+ arrangements aimed at stabilising global oil markets through coordinated output policies. This collaboration helps manage price volatility and supports market predictability amid growing geopolitical and economic uncertainty. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly advocated for deeper strategic coordination between the GCC and Central Asia to ensure long-term energy security at both regional and global levels.

Addressing Shared Challenges

Beyond production policy, shared challenges posed by the fourth energy transition can become another topic for discussion between the GCC and Central Asian States in the future. For instance, they can discuss a collective response to external regulatory pressures, such as the European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) which imposes new sustainability and transparency requirements on suppliers in global energy value chains. Coordinated action in this sphere could help producers in both regions adapt to evolving compliance standards and safeguard their access to European markets.

Despite this momentum, several barriers persist. Many initiatives remain in the early stages of implementation or even stagnate. Knowledge-sharing programs are limited in scope or entirely absent. Tensions within OPEC+ have also begun to surface, as evidenced by Kazakhstan’s 2025 statement prioritising national interests over quota compliance.

Geopolitically, Central Asia remains intertwined with Russian infrastructure. As of 2024, roughly 80 percent of Kazakh oil continues to transit through Russian pipelines, rendering Gulf investment politically sensitive. Simultaneously, China’s entrenched dominance in regional energy—via pipelines and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects—restricts Gulf access and introduces competitive pressures.

Security risks also pose significant challenges. The TAPI pipeline remains stalled due to instability in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban has pledged to protect the project, lingering uncertainty continues to deter Gulf investors. Infrastructure constraints further complicate energy connectivity: Central Asia’s landlocked geography makes it reliant on third-party transit states. Key projects such as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline remain unrealised, limiting Turkmenistan’s access to European markets.

Iran’s exclusion from regional transport plans—due to international sanctions—prevents fuller connectivity between Central Asia and the Gulf. Internally, Central Asian states grapple with regulatory and legal obstacles, including inconsistent frameworks and weak rule of law, which deter long-term foreign investment.

Nevertheless, the intersection of global energy realignment and regional ambition has opened a window of opportunity for enhanced Gulf-Central Asia energy cooperation. Both regions are resource-rich and seek economic diversification amid global volatility. Their growing collaboration spans investments, logistics, policy coordination, and knowledge exchange—laying the foundations for a potential Eurasian energy corridor.

Yet transforming this potential into a durable alliance will require sustained commitment, improved infrastructure, legal harmonisation, and careful geopolitical navigation. If successful, this partnership could reshape the energy geography of Eurasia and anchor both regions more securely within the global energy order.

Nikolay Kozhanov is Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University and Non-Resident Scholar at the Economics and Energy Program of the Middle East Institute.

Section: (integrated-futures-initiative) Photo: Canva